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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
No. 17-2813 
_____________ 
 
ARTURO DELACRUZ, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
    
________________ 
 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the 
District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-16-cv-02078) 
District Judge:  Hon. Michael A. Shipp 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
November 19, 2019 
 
Before:  CHAGARES, MATEY, and FUENTES, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion filed: November 21, 2019) 
 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
                                              
*  This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Arturo Delacruz was sentenced to 108 months of imprisonment after pleading 
guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robberies.  He now challenges the 
District Court’s denial of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255.  We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I. 
We write exclusively for the parties, so our summary of the facts is brief.  
Delacruz pleaded guilty to a single-count Information charging him with conspiracy to 
commit Hobbs Act robberies, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a).  The guilty plea 
encompassed three robberies in Trenton, New Jersey:  a robbery of the Sabor Latino Bar, 
a robbery of the Rapido Flores Multiservices Agency, and a robbery of a Gulf Service 
Station. 
Delacruz’s plea agreement stated the parties’ understanding that under the 
advisory U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, the total offense level would be 29.  As 
relevant here, Delacruz stipulated that the adjusted offense level for the Sabor Latino Bar 
robbery was 29, resulting, in part, from a six-level increase for a firearm that was not 
discharged but was “otherwise used.”  U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B).  The three robberies 
did not group together and produced a combined offense level of 32.  That combined 
offense level was then reduced by three levels for Delacruz’s acceptance of 
responsibility.   
At Delacruz’s sentencing hearing on March 30, 2015, the sentencing judge agreed 
that the total offense level was 29.  The total offense level, combined with Delacruz’s 
3 
Criminal History Category of I, corresponded to an advisory Guidelines range of 87 to 
108 months of imprisonment.  The sentencing judge imposed a 108-month term of 
imprisonment, to be followed by a three-year term of supervised release. 
Delacruz did not directly appeal.  But in 2016, he filed a pro se motion under 28 
U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that his trial attorney was ineffective for failing to object to 
certain sentencing enhancements.  In an order entered on July 24, 2017, the District Court 
denied Delacruz’s § 2255 motion, holding that he failed to show his attorney’s 
performance was deficient. 
This appeal timely followed.  We granted a certificate of appealability limited to 
the sole question of whether Delacruz’s trial attorney was ineffective for failing to 
negotiate a five-level enhancement for “brandishing” a firearm, as opposed to the agreed-
upon six-level enhancement for a firearm that was “otherwise used.”  See U.S.S.G. § 
2B3.1(b)(2)(B), (C).  We then appointed pro bono counsel to represent Delacruz.1 
II. 
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 2255, and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a).  When reviewing the denial of a 
§ 2255 motion, we examine “legal determinations de novo, factual findings for clear 
error, and matters committed to the District Court’s discretion for abuse thereof.”  United 
States v. Doe, 810 F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 2015). 
                                              
1  We thank counsel for agreeing to take this case pro bono and commend them for their 
excellent briefing. 
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III. 
Delacruz argues that he did not explicitly admit to facts that would support a six-
level “otherwise used” firearm enhancement for the Sabor Latino Bar robbery.  
Therefore, he contends that his attorney was ineffective during plea negotiations because 
he failed to negotiate a lower five-level increase for merely “brandishing” a firearm.  See 
U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(B), (C).2 
The Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel “protects plea 
bargaining, in part because poor bargaining can lead to heavier sentences.”  Richardson v. 
Superintendent Coal Twp. SCI, 905 F.3d 750, 765 (3d Cir. 2018).  Claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel are governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  
Under Strickland, Delacruz had to show that (1) the errors by his attorney were so serious 
that his counsel did not perform the function guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and 
(2) his attorney’s deficient performance prejudiced him.  466 U.S. at 687. 
We agree with the District Court that Delacruz has not established his trial 
attorney’s performance was deficient under Strickland’s first prong.  To make that 
showing, Delacruz had to demonstrate that his trial attorney’s performance was “so 
deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing 
                                              
2  The Government posits that Delacruz forfeited his argument that his trial attorney was 
ineffective during plea negotiations because his pro se § 2255 motion in the District 
Court focused solely on his attorney’s performance during the sentencing hearing.  We do 
not read Delacruz’s motion so narrowly.  See Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 
915 F.3d 928, 941 (3d Cir. 2019) (explaining, in the context of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 
motion, that “[a] habeas corpus petition prepared by a prisoner without legal assistance 
may not be skillfully drawn and should thus be read generously” (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
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professional norms.”  Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 169 (3d Cir. 1999).  In assessing 
counsel’s conduct, we “must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls 
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
Delacruz’s trial attorney reasonably did not seek to negotiate the six-level 
“otherwise used” firearm enhancement down to a five-level “brandishing” enhancement.  
As the District Court observed, Delacruz used a firearm explicitly to threaten and 
intimidate hostages.  The Presentence Investigation Report states that during the Sabor 
Latino Bar robbery, Delacruz and his co-conspirator pointed guns at employees and 
patrons of the bar and then used plastic zip-tie straps to restrain them at gunpoint.  
Delacruz did not object to these factual circumstances of his offense at sentencing, and 
they are consistent with his admission at the plea hearing that “at least one victim was 
physically assaulted and restrained by plastic zip ties.”  Joint Appendix 137. 
Faced with that factual basis for the “otherwise used” enhancement, Delacruz’s 
trial attorney reasonably did not seek to negotiate down to a lower five-level 
enhancement for merely “brandishing” a firearm.  As we have explained, “[p]ointing a 
weapon at a specific person or group of people, in a manner that is explicitly threatening, 
is sufficient to make out ‘otherwise use’ of that weapon.”  United States v. Johnson, 199 
F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir. 1999).  We therefore cannot conclude that the failure to negotiate 
the “otherwise used” enhancement fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.  
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
